Consider a town in which only two residents, Lorenzo and Neha, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Lorenzo and Neha can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. Assume that outside water cannot be transported into the town for sale. The following questions will walk you through how to compute the Cournot quantity competition outcome for these duopolists. Consider the market demand curve for water and the marginal cost for collecting water on the following graph. Assume Lorenzo believes that Neha is going to collect 12 gallons of water to sell. On the graph, use the purple points (diamond symbols) to plot the demand curve (D1) Lorenzo faces; then use the grey points (star symbol) to plot the marginal revenue curve (MR1) Lorenzo faces. Finally, use the black point (plus symbol) to indicate the profit-maximizing price and quantity (Profit Max 1) in this case. Instead, now assume Lorenzo believes that Neha is going to collect 16 gallons of water to sell, rather than 12. On the following graph, use the purple points (diamond symbol) to plot the demand curve (D2 ) Lorenzo faces; then use the grey points (star symbol) to plot the marginal revenue curve (MR2 ) Lorenzo faces. Finally, use the black point (plus symbol) to indicate the profit-maximizing price and quantity (Profit Max 2) in this case. Fill in the following table with the quantity of water Lorenzo produces, given various production choices by Neha. Given the information in this table, use the green points (triangle symbol) to plot Lorenzo's best-response function (BRF) on the following graph. Since Lorenzo and Neha face the same costs for producing water, Neha's best-response function is simply the reverse of Lorenzo's; that is, the curve has the same shape, but the horizontal and vertical intercept values are switched. Therefore, you can derive Neha's best-response function by following the same analysis as in the previous question, but from Neha's perspective. Use the purple points (diamond symbol) to plot her best-response function on the graph. Finally, use the black point (plus symbol) to indicate the unique Nash equilibrium under Cournot quantity competition. True or False: According to her best-response function, Neha will always want to decrease her output as Lorenzo decreases his. O True O False