Consider an economy in which there is initially one firm, HealthyBreakfast, in the market for breakfast cereal. A newfirm, TastyCereal, is deciding whether to enter the market, which would then change the market to a duopoly.HealthyBreakfast's costs of production are either high or low, if HealthyBreakfast has low costs, then it will be able tocharge a lower price than TastyCereal, and TastyCereal will earn negative profit from entry. If HealthyBreakfast hashigh costs, however, then TastyCereal will be able to compete, earning profits of $9 million and reducingHealthyBreakfast's profits to $3 million. The payoffs from the four possible outcomes are given in the followingdiagram (HealthyBreakfast's Payoff, TastyCereal's Payoff).The diagram shows this game: First, luck and past investments (or "nature") determine whether HealthyBreakfasthas high or low costs, then, TastyCereal decides whether to enter the market (without being able to observeHealthyBreakfast's costs).If TastyCereal knows that the probability of HealthyBreakfast having high costs is 0.60, then the expected profit fromentering is _____ million.Suppose HealthyBreakfast has high costs but wants to signal to TastyCereal that it has low costs. To do so, it lowersits prices, thereby reducing its profits. This strategy is only advantageous to HealthyBreakfast as long as it reducesits profits by less than ____ million and TastyCereal responds to the signal and does not enter.